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Financial Reform: Making the
System Safer and Fairer
Mich a el S. Ba r r

In the fall of 2008, the financial crisis crushed
the U.S. economy and plunged the country into
the Great Recession. The crisis shuttered
American businesses, cost millions of Americans their jobs, and wiped out home values
and household savings. The macro effects hit
hardest and were the longest lasting for those
least able to bear the brunt of the crisis. It was
devastating to middle-income families and
perhaps even more so to low- and moderateincome households, who had little financial
buffer (Barr 2012a). Financial stability, never
robust for these families, dropped precipitously (Barr and Schaffa 2016). Both in the
United States and globally, the crisis has led to
a series of fundamental reforms. (For an early
analysis, see Barr 2012b). At the same time,
more needs to be done to make the financial
system safer, fairer, and better harnessed to the
needs of the real economy. This essay first describes the origins of the financial crisis and
then outlines domestic reforms. It then turns
to the need for global coordination in financial
reform, and analyzes steps taken thus far,
while highlighting some of the key remaining
challenges ahead. Finally, it introduces other
articles in this volume, produced as part of a

2014 conference on financial reform organized
by the University of Michigan’s Center on Finance, Law and Policy, sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation.1
T h e R o o t s o f t h e F i n a n c i a l Cr i s i s

The financial crisis was not an act of nature,
or a fluke of history. Rather, the crisis was
rooted in years of unconstrained excess and
failures of risk management on Wall Street,
and prolonged complacency in Washington
and in major financial capitals around the
world. That complacency was based on a misplaced ideology: that private markets would
take care of risk regulation on their own. And
it was based on a misunderstanding: that
somehow, since the risk of bank runs had been
conquered, there was no risk to “shadow banking.” Market discipline, it was believed, would
force firms to engage in sound risk management. Market-based financing, it was thought,
would protect taxpayers, since no federally insured deposits were at risk. But both the ideology and the understanding were deeply flawed.
The costs of failure—regardless of the nature
of financial intermediation or the corporate
structure of the financial firm—were borne
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throughout society, and not fully internalized
to the firms’ managers, shareholders, and
creditors. Indeed, government intervention to
prevent even more brutal damage to the economy had the effect of helping to insulate the
firms’ stakeholders from full harm.
The financial sector engaged in highly leveraged, short-funded maturity transformation
with too little transparency, not enough capital, and little restraint. Large firms became
more interconnected. Investment banks and
other financial conglomerates relied increasingly on short-term funding from money market funds, securities lenders, and securities
lenders’ prime brokerage business. This shortterm funding was subject to runs during periods of market uncertainty, just like bank deposits before the age of deposit insurance and
a lender of last resort in the form of the Federal
Reserve (see, for example, Gorton and Metrick
2012). Huge amounts of risk moved outside the
more regulated parts of the banking system to
the unregulated markets, where it was easier
to increase leverage. Legal loopholes and regulatory gaps allowed firms to evade oversight.
Investment banks such as Lehman Brothers,
insurance conglomerates such as AIG, and
other entities performing the same market
functions as banks escaped meaningful regulation because of their corporate form. Banks
themselves moved activities off the balance
sheet—for example, to special-purpose vehicles holding mortgage-backed securities, and
outside the reach of more stringent regulation
and capital rules.
Shadow banking markets were opaque and
hid growing risk. Derivatives were traded in the
shadows with insufficient capital to back the
trades. Repo markets—short-term wholesale
funding used by broker-dealers and banks—
became riskier as they grew to be a larger portion of financial intermediation, and collateral
shifted from treasuries to poorer-quality assetbacked securities. The lack of transparency in
securitization hid the growing wedge in incentives facing different players in the system, and
the system failed to require sufficient responsibility from those who made loans, or packaged them into complex instruments to be
sold to investors. Synthetic products—essentially offsetting derivatives bets—multiplied
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risks in the securitization system and allowed
the market to increase its exposure to mortgage-backed securities.
The financial sector, under the guise of innovation, piled ill-considered risk upon risk.
Rapid growth in key markets hid misaligned
incentives and underlying risk. Managers
failed to understand new risks, or when they
did, they took steps that made the system as a
whole worse off. Financial institutions held increasingly inadequate capital against growing
risks, and regulators failed to stop them. Managers, traders, firms, credit-rating agencies,
and other gatekeepers all let short-term rewards from new financial products and rapidly
growing markets blind them to the risks.
Congress and regulators weakened consumer and investor protections in the name
of the free market. Households took on risk
that they often did not fully understand and
could ill afford. Investors bought implausibly
labeled AAA securities. Mortgage fraud, securities fraud, fraudulent manipulation of key
indices and currency markets—all harmed
individuals and institutional investors and
undermined the integrity of the market as a
whole. Rising home prices helped to feed the
financial system’s rapid growth and to hide
the declining underwriting standards for the
origination and securitization of mortgage
loans.
When home prices began to flatten, and
then to decline, fault lines were revealed. Mortgage defaults soared and the assets based
on mortgages plunged in value. The asset implosion in housing led to cascades throughout
the financial system. Nonbank mortgage lenders collapsed. Investment banks could no longer borrow. Fire sales of assets, collateral calls
on derivative contracts, and the tightening or
closing off of repo and commercial paper markets drove firms closer to the edge. Contagion
gripped the financial system, as the problems
at weaker firms undermined stronger ones.
Failures in the shadow banking system led to
failures in more regulated parts of the banking
system. Then, in the fall of 2008, credit markets froze. The overreliance on short-term financing and excessive risk taking that had produced significant profit in financial capitals in
the developed economies across the world
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fanned a panic that nearly collapsed the global
financial system.
Ov e r v i e w o f R e f o r m s

In the United States, passage of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) ushered in
comprehensive reform in key areas: enlarging
the regulatory perimeter by creating the authority to regulate financial firms that pose a
threat to financial stability, without regard to
their corporate form; enacting a resolution authority to deal with the potential collapse of
these major firms in the event of a crisis, without feeding a panic or putting taxpayers on the
hook; attacking regulatory arbitrage, restricting risky activities, and beefing up banking supervision; requiring central clearing and exchange trading of standardized derivatives,
and capital, margin and transparency throughout the market; improving investor protections; and establishing a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to look out for the
interests of American households.
Today, major financial firms are subject to
higher prudential standards, including higher
capital and liquidity requirements, stress tests,
and resolution planning through “living wills.”
By forcing firms to internalize more of the costs
that they impose on the system, they will be
incentivized to shrink and reduce their complexity, leverage, and interconnections. Should
such a firm fail, there will be a bigger capital
buffer to absorb losses. To stem a panic, the
Dodd-Frank Act permits the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to resolve the largest and most interconnected financial companies without exposing the system to a sudden,
disorderly failure that puts the economy at risk.
On the global level, the international community has put forward new rules on capital,
so that there are bigger buffers in the system
in the event of failures. Capital will be measured in a more conservative way, and capital
levels are going up significantly. Systemically
important firms will hold even higher levels of
capital. There are new rules on liquidity and a
global leverage limit. Derivatives reforms are
proceeding, as are new approaches to dealing
with the risks from repo and securities financing transactions.

Yet much more work remains to be done,
and the financial sector did not leave the battlefield after their defeats in 2010. Far from it.
The brutal fight over financial reform rages on,
and there is serious risk that a collective amnesia about the causes and consequences of
the financial crisis appears to be descending
on global financial capitals that will further
weaken the resolve for reform (See, for example, Coffee 2011, 2012).
C o m pa r i n g U . S . F i n a n c i a l
R eg u l at i o n Pr e - Cr i s i s a n d
P o s t-R e f o r m

Many readers may be skeptical regarding the
efficacy of the reforms that have taken place
thus far, either because they think they did not
change the system enough, or because they
think that they went too far. The following section takes the time to chart the path of reform
so far, before turning to the difficulties and
dangers on the road ahead.
First, before Dodd-Frank, if an entity was a
bank, it had tougher regulations, more stringent capital requirements, and more robust
supervision; but if an entity was an investment
bank engaged in the same kind of maturity
transformation, it had to abide by different
rules (see Scott 2010). When U.S. investment
banks needed to find a “consolidated holding
company regulator” in order to meet European
Union standards for doing business in Europe,
the Securities and Exchange Commission set
up a voluntary Consolidated Supervised Entity
program which had little oversight. The SEC
was not established as a prudential regulator,
did not have clear supervisory power, and had
little experience and few trained examiners.
Moreover, the leverage ratio that served as a
backstop for bank capital requirements was
not applied to investment banks.
The Federal Reserve was too lax in supervising firms where it did have authority and it did
not have any authority to set and enforce capital requirements on the major institutions
that operated businesses outside of bank holding companies. That meant it had no supervision over investment banks, diversified financial institutions such as AIG, or the nonbank
financial companies competing with banks in
the mortgage, consumer credit, and business
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lending markets. The Office of Thrift Supervision viewed its role as supervising thrifts, not
their holding companies (such as AIG). Banks
and thrifts freely engaged in risky mortgage
lending, and regulators did not step in until it
was too late.
Today, Dodd-Frank has provided authority
for clear, strong and consolidated supervision
and regulation by the Federal Reserve of any
financial firm—regardless of legal form—
whose failure could pose a threat to financial
stability. The largest investment banks that
survived the financial crisis merged into or became bank holding companies subject to Fed
oversight. AIG, GE Capital, Prudential, and
MetLife have now been brought under Fed supervision through the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) designation. As a result
of Dodd-Frank changes, thrift holding companies (including those with large insurance operations) are now supervised by the Fed. The
Office of Thrift Supervision and the SEC’s investment bank regime have been abolished.
Thus, all bank and thrift holding companies,
as well as systemically important nonbank
firms, regardless of corporate form, are supervised by the Federal Reserve. We will have a
single point of accountability for tougher and
more consistent supervision of the largest and
most interconnected financial firms.
Although the regulatory infrastructure is, to
put it mildly, far from ideal, with too many divided responsibilities and too many opportunities for turf battles or regulatory gaps, Dodd-
Frank created the FSOC, which is responsible
for identifying threats to financial stability and
dealing with them. The FSOC can recommend
stricter regulatory action, and regulators must
either implement such changes or explain publicly why they are not acting (see Gerson 2013).
Already, this process has led the SEC to impose
stricter regulation of money market funds than
would otherwise have occurred (Barr 2015a).
The FSOC has the potential to get information
across the financial services marketplace
through the Office of Financial Research (OFR),
which Dodd-Frank established and empowered to collect data from any financial firm,
and to develop and enforce standardization for
data collection. The OFR has begun to use this
authority by developing a “legal entity identi-
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fier” for financial transactions. The OFR is
charged with independently assessing risks in
the financial system, and can potentially serve
as a counterweight to the Fed by providing independent assessments of whether the Fed is
adequately supervising the largest firms and
dealing with the critical issues in systemic risk.
A strong OFR can serve as a check and balance
for regulatory agencies, ensuring that they improve their own performance or risk being criticized (Ludwig 2012; Barr 2015a).
Dodd-Frank provides for more stringent
prudential standards and higher capital and
liquidity standards for the largest bank and
nonbank firms. In addition to the heightened
capital requirements applicable to all firms,
the largest firms are subject to a capital surcharge, a leverage ratio, a toughened supplemental leverage ratio, a more stringent liquidity requirement, and capital required to pass
stress tests.
Already, capital levels in the banking system
have doubled, and banks’ use of short-term
nondeposit funding has plummeted. The annual stress tests are evaluating a firm’s ability
to withstand deep market contractions. There
are enhanced rules on affiliate transactions
and lending limits, and much stricter proposed limits on counterparty credit exposures.
Deposit insurance premiums are going up on
the very largest firms. The Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from engaging in certain
proprietary trading or running internal hedge
funds, subject to a number of exceptions, and
also helps to simplify the task of winding down
major firms that are at risk of failure. Moreover, the Fed is using macro-prudential supervision as it increases its capacity to understand
and mitigate risks to the financial system as a
whole.
There is a healthy debate about breaking up
or limiting the size of financial firms. Under
the Dodd-Frank Act, major firms are subject to
a concentration limit that generally prohibits
a financial company from engaging in mergers
or acquisitions that would result in the firm’s
liabilities—including wholesale funding and
off-balance sheet exposures—exceeding 10 percent of the liabilities of financial companies as
a whole. Dodd-Frank provides regulators with
the authority to require financial institutions
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to restructure their activities to make it credible that they can be resolved if they are in danger of collapse; the resolution planning process has already forced firms to begin to
simplify their organization form, develop
“clean” holding companies, and place large
amounts of capital and long-term debt in the
holding company to assist with the resolution.
The act also permits regulators to force firms
to be broken up if they fail to submit a credible
plan and thereafter fail to meet regulators’ requirements to restructure themselves to make
resolution credible. Such firms can also be broken up if they are found to pose a grave threat
to financial stability. These enhanced prudential measures for major financial firms are
likely to reduce risk in the financial system,
constrain further concentration, and reduce
“too big to fail” distortions.
Second, before Dodd-Frank, shadow banking markets grew dramatically with little oversight and in the absence of even regulatory or
marketwide knowledge about the nature of the
markets they were serving. For example, the
OTC derivatives market—with a notional
amount of $700 trillion at its peak—grew up in
the shadows, with little oversight. Credit derivatives, which were supposed to diffuse risk,
instead concentrated it. Synthetic securitization with embedded derivatives magnified failures in the real securitization market. Major
financial firms used derivatives to increase
their credit exposure to each other, rather than
decrease it.
We should never again face a situation—
such as AIG’s $2 trillion derivatives portfolio—
where the potential failure of a virtually unregulated, capital-deficient major player in the
derivatives market can impose devastating
risks on the entire system. Insufficient capital
meant that major participants in the system
could not reliably pay out on their obligations,
and insufficient margin meant that counterparties on every transaction were more exposed to the risk of nonpayment. When the
crisis began, regulators, financial firms, and
investors had an insufficient understanding of
the degree to which trouble at one firm spelled
trouble for another, because of the opacity of
the market. This lack of information magnified
the contagion as the crisis intensified, causing

a damaging wave of margin increases, deleveraging, and credit market breakdowns. Lack of
transparency, insufficient supervision, and inadequate capital and margin left our financial
system vulnerable to concentrations of risk,
and to abuse.
Today, under Dodd-Frank, regulators are
putting in place the tools comprehensively to
regulate the OTC derivatives market for the
first time. The act requires all standardized derivatives to be centrally cleared, which will substantially reduce the buildup of bilateral counterparty credit risk between major financial
firms. Under Dodd-Frank rules, 75 percent of
new derivative contracts were centrally cleared
in 2015 as compared to only 15 percent in 2007
(Massad 2015). Central clearinghouses are subject to strong prudential supervision under the
Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank requires standardized derivatives to be traded on exchanges
or alternative swap execution facilities, which
improves pre- and post-trade price transparency. Trading transparency will help to improve price competition as well as to improve
safety and soundness, as market participants
and regulators will have full access to current
prices in the event of system disruptions. Even
non-centrally-cleared OTC derivatives are to be
reported to a trade repository, making the market far more transparent.
The act provides for prudential regulation,
capital requirements, and business conduct
rules for all swap dealers and major swap participants. It provides for robust capital and
margin requirements for derivative transactions, and higher requirements for those that
are not centrally cleared, providing a strong incentive to use central clearing and maintain a
bigger buffer against losses. It also provides for
regulatory and enforcement tools to go after
manipulation, fraud, and other abuse.
At the same time as the act reforms derivatives markets, it provides a new framework for
regulation of financial market utilities and critical payment, clearing, and settlement activities, including not only those in the derivatives
markets but also those in the wholesale funding markets—securities financing transactions
(such as repo and securities lending), commercial paper, and prime brokerage—that are critical to the shadow banking system.
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In the lead-up to the financial crisis, major
financial firms became increasingly funded not
by traditional bank deposits, nor even longer-
term funding in the commercial markets, but
rather by overnight funding in the repo markets. An important part of that market, the triparty repo market, became increasingly concentrated in only two major clearing banks,
which were themselves exposed to counterparty risk from securities firms borrowing intraday credit. As the triparty repo market became more concentrated, it also became riskier
because counterparties came to accept not
only Treasury securities as collateral, but also
highly rated but opaque asset-backed securities. These securities in turn became riskier as
credit rating agencies became increasingly
willing to label as safe assets that were lower
quality, including pools of securities backed
only by poorly underwritten subprime and AltA mortgages. When the financial crisis hit,
repo and commercial paper markets froze, and
investors in money market funds ran, causing
a massive contraction in credit not only for financial firms but also major firms in the real
economy (that is, non-financial). This contraction was overcome only with massive interventions by the Fed, the FDIC, and the Treasury.
The Dodd-Frank Act provides the foundation fundamentally to reform the wholesale
funding markets by providing strong authority
for the Federal Reserve to regulate financial
market utilities and critical payment, clearing,
and settlement activities; to set new rules for
capital, collateral, and margin requirements
for repo and other securities financing, and
other critical markets; and to establish uniform prudential standards throughout the financial system. While repo and other securities financing policies are still a work in
progress, short-term financing reforms are already being reinforced by new capital and liquidity requirements, liability concentration
limits under the act, and reforms to the assessment base for deposit insurance that encompass all liabilities. Once fully implemented,
these reforms will have the combined effect of
taxing short-term liabilities, which will force
firms to internalize more of the costs of short-
term funding. These steps have already reduced the use of short-term funding, and will
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provide incentives to manage their use more
carefully even when interest rates normalize.
The act also fundamentally transforms regulation of another major element of the
shadow banking system, securitization. The
act requires deep transparency into the structure of securitizations, including information
about assets and originators. Securitization
sponsors must generally retain risk in their securitizations, unless the mortgages they pool
meet guidelines as plain vanilla “qualified residential mortgages” so that incentives are better aligned among participants in the system.
Capital rules will better account for risk in securitizations. Parallel changes in accounting
rules will now bring the most common forms
of securitization onto the balance sheet.
Credit-rating agencies will be subject to heightened liability for failure to conduct ratings
with integrity, with comprehensive oversight
by the SEC, including policing of ratings shopping and conflicts of interest; ratings themselves will be more transparent and will include key information on rating methodology,
compliance, qualitative and quantitative data,
due diligence, and other protections.
Third, before Dodd-Frank, consumer protection regulation was fragmented over seven
federal regulators, and prudential regulators
often viewed consumer protection with hostility. Regulators lacked mission focus, market-
wide coverage, and consolidated authority.
Nonbanks could avoid federal supervision.
Banks could choose the least restrictive consumer approach among several different banking agencies. Federal regulators pre-empted
state consumer protections laws without adequately replacing these important safeguards.
Fragmentation of rule writing, supervision and
enforcement led to finger pointing in place of
effective action.
Today, despite repeated congressional efforts to block its director, stymie its funding,
overturn its structure and undermine its authority, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has been built into a strong organization. It has marketwide coverage and is
setting new rules of the road for banks and
nonbanks alike to police against abuses. It has
strong supervisory authority over banks with
at least $10 billion in assets and over broad
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parts of the nonbank markets. It is basing its
work on an empirically grounded understanding of human behavior (see Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2009), rather than abstract
models and ideological assumptions. And it is
already helping to end misleading sales pitches
and hidden traps. Rather, it is making space
for banks and nonbanks to compete vigorously
for consumers on the basis of price and quality. It is strongly independent—with secure
funding, policy, regulatory and enforcement
authority—and strongly accountable, with regular reporting to the Congress and the public
(see Barr 2015a).
The CFPB has already made significant
progress in making financial services markets
work better. For example, implementation of
rules under the Credit Card Act of 2009 is saving consumers nearly $12 billion annually in
reduced credit card fees, without increasing
interest rates or undermining access (Agarwal
et al. 2015). Reforms of the mortgage market
are helping to eliminate some of the worst
abuses such as steering low-income and minority borrowers to high-cost loans; mortgage
disclosures are now both simpler and more informative; and mortgage servicing is being
strongly policed. The CFPB is tackling a broad
range of other critical issues, including auto,
student, and payday loans; credit reporting
and debt collection; and protection of military
service members and their families. CFPB enforcement actions had resulted in more than
$11 billion in relief to 25 million consumers as
of 2015 (Cordray 2015). Key upcoming decisions
include whether and how the CFPB should regulate or prohibit mandatory predispute arbitration agreements (Barr 2015b).
Fourth, before Dodd-Frank, the government
did not have the authority to unwind large,
highly leveraged, and substantially interconnected financial firms that failed—such as
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG—
without disrupting the broader financial system. Firms benefitted from the perception that
they were “too-big-to-fail,” which reduced market discipline and encouraged excessive risk
taking by firms. It provided an artificial incentive for large firms to grow and tipped the playing field in favor of the largest firms. When the
financial crisis hit, the inability to resolve

these firms left the government with the untenable choice between taxpayer-funded bailouts, as with AIG, or the disorderly financial
collapse of a major firm, as with Lehman
Brothers, the failure of which contributed to
widespread financial cascades and contagion
that threatened to bring down the financial
system, and harmed the real economy.
Today, major bank and nonbank financial
firms are subject to heightened prudential
standards, including higher capital and liquidity requirements, stress tests, and “living
wills.” The living wills process is forcing firms
to simplify their organizational forms, develop
“clean” holding companies that can be resolved without disrupting their subsidiaries’
functions. Firms are being required to hold sufficient capital and long-term debt at the holding company level to permit resolution. Global
derivatives contracts are being rewritten to permit resolution without triggering cross-
defaults and the seizure of collateral. Firms
will be forced by these standards to internalize
more of the costs that they might impose on
the system, which will give them incentives to
shrink and reduce their complexity, leverage,
and interconnections. Should such a firm fail,
there will be a bigger capital buffer to absorb
losses. These measures will, over time, help to
reduce risks in and among the largest financial
institutions. In the event that such an institution fails, these actions will minimize the risk
that a firm’s failure will pose a danger to the
stability of the financial system. But that is not
enough. The government also needs the tools
to respond in a crisis, to prevent financial collapse, and to protect taxpayers.
That is why Dodd-Frank permits the FDIC
to resolve the largest and most interconnected
financial companies, consistent with the approach long taken for bank failures. Under the
Orderly Liquidation Authority, the FDIC now
has the capacity to deal with the potential failure of a major financial conglomerate in an
orderly fashion that limits collateral damage
to the system. Shareholders and other providers of regulatory capital and long-term convertible debt to the firm will be forced to absorb
any losses.
The FDIC has made significant progress in
developing a strategy under the Dodd-Frank
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authorities, known as the “single point of entry,” which would permit the holding company
of a financial conglomerate to be resolved
without necessarily disrupting the ability of its
operating subsidiaries—bank, broker-dealer,
or other parts—to function. Firms are required
to hold sufficient long-term debt at the holding-
company level to facilitate an orderly winding
down of the holding company while permitting operating subsidiaries of the firm to continue to operate. Management can be terminated and the compensation of culpable
managers can be clawed back. Critical assets
and liabilities of the firm can be transferred to
a bridge institution so that the firm can be resolved without causing cascading collapses in
the financial system. In the event that the
firm’s internal capital and long-term debt are
insufficient to support restructuring and ongoing operations, liquidity can be obtained
through Treasury borrowing that is automatically repaid from the sale of assets of the failed
firm or, if necessary, from a preauthorized,
ex post assessment on the largest financial
firms—not by taxpayers. In this manner, the
resolution authority allows the government to
resolve the financial conglomerate without exposing the system to a sudden disorderly failure that puts the whole financial sector at risk.
We need to have deep humility, however,
about the ability to predict or manage the failure of a major financial firm, and even more
so about the ability to deal with the failure of
multiple firms during a financial crisis. Moreover, the creation of a domestic resolution authority and the broad range of domestic reforms just discussed are not enough to deal
with global financial risks.
G lo b a l R e f o r m s : Ov e r v i e w

Global reforms undertaken to date have made
the financial system safer, but there remain
real questions about whether the financial system is safe enough. Much of the reform agenda
is still a work in progress, from capital standards to regulation of derivatives and shadow
banking markets, to the mechanisms necessary to wind down cross-border firms that get
into financial distress. In the wake of the financial crisis, the leading economies produced a
new set of institutions and institutional rela-
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tionships that were more formal and more hierarchical and were designed to improve prospects for coordination. Although significant
tensions still exist within this new system—
particularly concerning national variation
(that is, the tailoring of global standards to individual domestic landscape), extraterritorial
application of national rules, and the desire
for uniform global standards—the substantive
outcomes to date, while imperfect, messy, and
contentious, evidence a stronger commitment
to meaningful, long-lasting reforms than had
been in place before the financial crisis.
There is still much more substantive work
to do—on capital and liquidity, resolution, and
derivatives, to name a few core areas in need
of action. In fact, such an approach is essential
if we are to reduce the chances of another devastating global financial crisis.
Global Capital Rules

Almost immediately in the wake of the crisis,
the G-20 countries began to examine the pre-
crisis weaknesses in the global bank capital
rules. Basel II.5, which targeted risks from off-
balance-sheet assets and market risks, was developed early in 2009 and was quickly adopted
by the major economies. By the G-20 summit
in Pittsburgh in September 2009, U.S. Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner had assembled a
consensus in favor of higher capital standards.
By late 2010, the bank regulatory standard-
setting body known as the Basel Committee
promulgated its “Basel III” capital standards,
significantly revising the frameworks from
“Basel I” and “Basel II” that had been in place
prior to the crisis. Basel IV reforms are being
implemented gradually across all Basel Committee member jurisdictions with full implementation set for January 1, 2019.
Basel III requires financial institutions to
hold much-higher-quality capital for trading
positions, securitization, and counterparty
credit exposures in derivatives and secured
lending transactions than its predecessor. The
new capital requirements focus on common
equity, significantly limiting other forms of
funding that did not act as a buffer to absorb
losses in a crisis. The revised rules require
banks to hold Tier 1 capital in an amount no
less than 6 percent of risk-weighted assets. Ba-
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sel III also introduces a new Common Equity
Tier 1 requirement, under which banks must
hold at least 4.5 percent of risk-weighted assets
in common equity. Basel III also reduces the
ability of banks to rely on riskier, less-absorbent
forms of regulatory capital and bars banks
from including lower-quality instruments in
regulatory capital. Basel III requires all firms
to hold a countercyclical “capital conservation
buffer,” with dividends, share buybacks, or bonuses limited if Common Equity Tier I levels
are within two and a half percentage points of
the minimum 4.5 percent Common Equity Tier
1 level.
Basel III for the first time also imposes a
global non-risk-based supplemental leverage
ratio that includes firms’ off-balance-sheet
commitments and exposures. The leverage ratio requires banks to hold Tier 1 capital equal
to 3 percent of their total exposures and is intended to supplement Basel’s risk-weighted
rules. Finally, firms posing the greatest risk to
the financial system are required to hold even
higher levels of capital—a surcharge” for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). All global systemically important banks
(G-SIBs) will bear this surcharge, with the most
systemically risky G-SIBs required to hold
more capital than those with less systemic importance.
Under Basel III, minimum capital ratios are
set at a level that represents a significant increase over prior rules. There are new requirements that include the creation of a capital
conservation buffer above the minimums,
which if breached will restrict firms’ ability to
pay dividends or buy back stock. The Basel
Committee has put forward a graduated, risk-
based, capital surcharge for the largest, most
interconnected financial firms. The global
rules also include new contingent capital instruments that facilitate “bail-ins”—in which
privately issued debt transforms into equity
under specified circumstances—to further reinforce that firms must internalize the costs of
their own failure and to facilitate the resolution of globally systemically important firms.
Furthermore, Basel III is instituting explicit
quantitative liquidity requirements for the first
time, to ensure that financial firms are better
prepared for liquidity strains.

But even as some jurisdictions rightly adopt
more stringent capital rules than those required under the Basel III approach, more
work is needed to strengthen the global capital
framework, at least for the largest firms. Risk-
based capital requirements need to be made
more transparent and comparable on a cross-
border and institution-by-institution basis,
and better substitutes need to be developed for
both the discredited credit-rating agencies and
the internal models of the regulated institutions. Additionally, both the global leverage ratio and the SIFI surcharge are simply too low
for either to serve as an effective buffer against
asset implosions or liquidity runs or to weigh
effectively against any subsidies to “too big to
fail” institutions. Moreover, as the countercyclical capital buffer is left to national economic
circumstances and discretion, national regulators should commit to economic triggers that
would increase capital requirements and use
other methods to reduce leverage under specified circumstances. Furthermore, stress testing, which has served a critical role in bolstering capital oversight in the United States, is in
need of further refinement, more transparency, and greater predictability.
Derivatives and Wholesale
Funding Markets

G-20 leaders at the 2009 Pittsburgh summit
also committed themselves to significant reforms in the OTC derivatives market. They
agreed that standardized OTC derivatives
should be moved onto exchange-trading platforms and should be centrally cleared. The
leaders also decided that all OTC derivative
trades—including those that remained purely
bilateral—should be reported to trade repositories. In 2011, the G-20 further agreed that
non-cleared-derivative contracts should be
subject to higher margin requirements. In key
jurisdictions, the statutory regimes for central
clearing, exchange-based trading, and trade reporting are now in place, with the frameworks
for margin requirements lagging behind. Regulatory implementation has lagged significantly behind legislation, and persistent technical, liability, and jurisdictional problems
with trade reporting and trade repositories
have obstructed regulators and market partic-
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ipants from attaining a comprehensive informational view of global derivatives markets.
Furthermore, global rules for repo and
other short-term funding markets remain nascent, with most jurisdictions only in the earliest phases of proposing rules. More regulatory
attention is needed on the issue of hot money,
which continues to pose significant risks to
systemic stability, to address weaknesses in
foreign currency markets, and to restore trust
and confidence to benchmark global rates
such as LIBOR (London Interbank Offered
Rate). In sum, much of the plumbing of the
financial system is still in need of reform (see
Duffie 2013).
Structural Reform and Resolution

Globally, much work remains to be done in the
area of structural reform and resolution. The
United States and the United Kingdom have
both embraced the need for ring fencing and
stronger horizontal buffers between retail deposit banks and other, riskier, financial functions, while the European Union has not adopted its expert commission’s suggestions in
that regard. In the Volcker Rule, the United
States has adopted the strongest version of
these reforms, but significant work still remains to be done on implementation in all
three jurisdictions. It is particularly important,
too, that ring fencing not be viewed as a panacea; structural reform will only prove effective
to the extent it is integrated with broader
changes in supervision, capital, and resolution
mechanisms (See Barr and Vickers 2013).
Progress on structural reform is also important because of the linkages between clearer
structures for financial conglomerates and
ease of resolution. “Living will” requirements,
such as those adopted in the United States, can
help ease the process of cross-border resolution by clarifying lines of authority and aligning business risk with organizational form, but
these approaches are contingent on regulators’
willingness to execute along the lines of the
directives of the will when most needed (see,
for example, Levitin 2011). The United States
and the United Kingdom have put in place a
memorandum of understanding to facilitate
cross-border resolution, and the single-point-
of-entry approach, under which a financial
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conglomerate’s top-tier holding company is
placed in resolution while its operating subsidiaries may continue to function, may make it
possible to resolve such firms even in the absence of a formal cross-border mechanism for
the resolution of highly complex firms. Only
time will tell.
The United States’ “single-point-of-entry”
model will facilitate the resolution of the largest financial conglomerates. In 2014, Europe
officially adopted its Single Resolution Mechanism, which will be administered by the European Central Bank as part of its new supervisory authority over the continent’s largest
banks and will be funded via contributions
from eligible banks, with national assessments
assimilated into a communitywide fund over
a number of years. The establishment of a European resolution and funding mechanism
will help break the link between a national government’s fiscal position and the health of domestic financial institutions—a link that exacerbated Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. The
crisis found many Eurozone countries unable
to support troubled banks, either because the
size of the bank exceeded national GDP or because public finances proved too unstable to
provide any assistance.
National implementation of more effective
resolution mechanisms has also been bolstered by the work of the FSB, which in 2011
released a set of best practices it considers
“necessary for an effective resolution regime.”
The FSB is also developing a resolvability assessment process that will be used to evaluate
the feasibility and credibility of national resolution mechanisms in the event of a globally
systemic firm (G-SIFI) failure. Despite these
significant regulatory advances, however, the
orderly resolution of systemically important,
highly complex cross-border firms will not be
feasible without more global cooperation and
a comprehensive transnational approach. Fortunately, the G-20 has recognized the important relationship between structure and resolvability. At the 2013 summit in St. Petersburg
the G-20 leadership instructed the FSB, the
IMF, and the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) to collaborate in assessing “cross-border consistencies and global financial stability implications
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[of structural reforms], taking into account
country-specific circumstances.”
Overall, the substantive global rules developed and implemented in the post-crisis era
are far more robust than their pre-crisis counterparts and provide far fewer opportunities
for regulatory arbitrage and evasion. Nonetheless, significant work remains, as does the underlying question of whether the current international financial regulatory architecture is
sufficient to the task of a truly sound global
financial system. Achieving more organizational simplicity and clarity in the financial
sector may also require new approaches altogether. For example, the United States put in
place a soft cap (10 percent of total financial
liabilities) on the global liabilities of U.S. firms;
once the cap is hit, these firms cannot merge
with or acquire other financial institutions. A
tax on the wholesale liabilities of financial
firms would further reinforce safety in the system by helping to constrain the size and complexity of financial conglomerates; it would
also help to offset the costs to society of potential future failures, forcing firms to internalize
more of those costs. The Obama administration proposed such a tax, but it never gained
traction in the United States. The IMF endorsed the idea in 2010, but it has received little attention since.
Even as the post-crisis intervention of the
G-20 in the global financial architecture has
resulted in a harder, more formal system with
a clearer hierarchy. More political accountability, and a stronger framework for generating,
implementing, and monitoring cross-border
rulemaking variations across domestic regulatory regimes have proliferated, with the leading economies engaged in an ambitious transnational strategy of regulatory competition.
Unlike in the pre-crisis era, however, national
variation and international regulatory competition to date have not resulted in widespread
races to the bottom and cross-border regulatory arbitrage. Instead, the post-crisis national
regulatory strategies have largely resulted in
upward deviations from an already more robust global regulatory floor—a global race to
the top.
This new financial architecture means that
national variation alone (defined earlier as the

tailoring of global standards to individual domestic landscape) can encourage this global
race to the top. It also rewards first movers on
a national basis, particularly as to the extraterritorial application of domestic rules. One
country can take the lead in developing more
robust extraterritorial standards than those required on a global level, and by doing so can
effectively push other countries into the adoption of similarly stringent rules.
For instance, many countries are requiring
firms to hold even more capital than the global
minimum set by Basel III. In the United States,
the supplemental leverage ratio for banks and
thrifts is set at 6 percent, double the Basel III–
required leverage ratio, and at 5 percent at the
bank–holding company level. Even Switzerland, a non-G-20 nation and a traditional “offshore” banking center, has set tougher requirements than required under Basel III standards.
For larger banks, Switzerland set higher capital
requirements, up to 19 percent for the two largest (UBS and Credit Suisse)—the so-called
“Swiss Finish,” meaning a Swiss-specific addition to global standards.
In addition to regulatory variation across
jurisdictions, some countries—including,
most notably, the United States—have also adopted aggressive extraterritorial strategies designed to force reform upward on a global basis. For instance, the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors has finalized new rules for foreign
banking organizations (FBOs) operating in the
United States. Under these rules, large FBOs
are required to place non-branch assets under
a U.S. intermediate holding company structure
subject to consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve. In many circumstances, FBOs will
also now need to meet U.S. capital and liquidity rules and prudential standards with respect
to their U.S. operations, in addition to the rules
they must meet under their home country’s
laws.
These rules are prudent measures to reduce
systemic risk and improve the safety and
soundness of the U.S. financial system. Strong
capital and liquidity rules will make these
firms more robust against failure and less subject to debilitating runs in a crisis. Moreover,
they help to make supervision and resolution
of foreign firms operating in the United States
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substantially more feasible, if such resolution
is required. In many ways, the rules are consistent with (or better than) the principle of national treatment, putting large FBOs and domestic banking organizations on similar
footing. Nevertheless, they have also engendered significant controversy because of their
extraterritorial reach, the potential to reduce
the efficiency of the capital and liquidity allocation of the consolidated firm globally, and
the significant structural reforms they require
from firms operating in the United States that
are headquartered beyond U.S. borders. It remains to be seen what effect the aggressive approach embodied in these new rules will have
on the regulatory positions of foreign jurisdictions; some fear retaliation, but in my judgment, similar rulemaking by other jurisdictions would advance the aim of more effective
regulation on a cross-border basis and should,
ideally, contribute to an evolving global race to
the top.
A similar strategy has taken hold between
the United States and European Union during
the development of domestic cross-border derivative regimes. The United States moved first,
with strong reforms under the Dodd–Frank
Act, followed by the release, by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), of a
muscular proposed set of rules with significant
extraterritorial reach. The rules drew significant criticism from foreign banking organizations, international swap dealers, and the European Commission, each of which understood
the rules to effectively limit market participants who traded with U.S. parties to U.S. exchanges, in the absence of real reforms elsewhere, thus triggering significant fears over
market fragmentation. As the CFTC considered these concerns and negotiated with the
European Commission, in 2013 it issued an exemptive order delaying the effective date of the
rules for several months. Not until the evening
before this exemptive order lapsed were the
CFTC and the European Commission able to
agree on a “common path forward” (Barr 2014,
1014–15).
This common-path agreement embraced
“equivalence,” whereby the United States will
consider European market participants and exchanges in compliance with both European
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and U.S. rules. Nevertheless, even as the CFTC’s
strategy of extraterritoriality has resulted in
stronger European rules and reduced the potential for arbitrage, it has also increased transatlantic tensions. Ideally, implementation of
extraterritorial rules would involve closer regulatory coordination between domestic and foreign jurisdictions—particularly where, as here,
there is a high degree of parallelism between
the European Union and the United States. Although the tensions between the United States
and the European Union over cross-border derivatives rules are not likely to scuttle cooperation over other dimensions of the global-
reform agenda, the possibility for transnational
enmity and the need for cooperation will both
grow as the global political commitment to reform wanes. The post-crisis experiences with
national variation and extraterritorial strategy
to date suggest that the G-20 should avoid the
adoption and implementation of rigid, detailed rulemaking on a cross-border basis and
should instead play the role of shepherd—
working through the FSB to produce rigorous,
robust prudential standards; correcting downward national deviations but otherwise encouraging strong domestic regimes that exceed minimum standards; and intervening
where necessary to minimize transnational
tensions.
Futur e R i s ks

Despite the enormous progress to date, we cannot afford to be complacent, and we need to
keep pushing for reform. The next section focuses on five types of risk the financial system
faces going forward—five ways it might fail
next time. Of course, economists don’t know
precisely how the risk in the system will evolve.
It is important to be humble about our ability
to understand new risks and predict financial
crises. That is why the most important step
economists and policymakers can take is to
build a system that is more resilient to the uncertain risks we face.
Amnesia

The first source of risk that could lead to another financial crisis is a kind of amnesia: the
danger that financial institutions, regulators,
lawmakers, and the public will forget the les-
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sons of the financial crisis and let the system
slip back into the practices that caused the last
financial crisis. This amnesia is likely to occur
as the crisis fades from memory and the financial system begins to feel safe again. No actor in
the financial system is immune from such amnesia. Within financial institutions, risk managers, who are responsible for monitoring and
managing a financial institution’s risk, can grow
complacent during good times. In addition,
managers and executives may push back against
risk managers who raise concerns about risky
but profitable practices and activities. In the
lead-up to the last crisis, some risk managers
who urged firms to exercise caution or recommended that firms place limits on certain activities and investments were demoted or fired.
Regulators are also susceptible to amnesia.
Regulatory discretion is essential to effective
financial regulation, but it also allows regulators to soften their stance over time. We saw
this before the last crisis. The public can also
quickly forget the lessons of the financial crisis
and the need for reform. Public attention to
the financial system wanes as reporting on the
financial system decreases and the fallout
from the crisis fades from memory. Unfortunately, when public attention wanes, lawmakers and regulators may feel that the public will
be less likely to hold them accountable in the
event of a future crisis and as a result will feel
less pressure to pass and implement meaningful reforms (Coffee 2011). Frankly, the financial
sector can and does seek to “buy” amnesia
through lobbying and campaign contributions
(Roe 1996). With public pressure off, the industry can work behind the scenes—in Congress,
in the federal rule-writing agencies, and in the
courts—to roll back reforms and prevent any
further restrictions (Coates 2015).
Although no actor in the financial system is
immune from amnesia, we can take steps to
ensure that institutions, regulators, and the
public remain vigilant in good times. Within
financial institutions we can continue to work
to better align executive and managerial compensation with the time horizons of risk. For
example, regulators should require that SIFIs
set up compensation systems such that the senior executives of a firm would have their bonuses clawed back in the event that the firm

fails to meet certain capital levels or is subject
to major fines or penalties.
We can include mechanisms within the regulatory architecture designed to reduce backsliding. Several such mechanisms were included in the new regulatory infrastructure
mandated by Dodd-Frank (see Barr 2015a). For
example, the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) has the authority to recommend stricter actions and to require regulators
to implement them, or else to explain their failure to do so to Congress and the public. Dodd-
Frank imposed a similar action-forcing disclosure requirement on the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau. Twice a year the director of
the CFPB is required to testify before and provide a report to Congress that includes not only
a summary of the bureau’s activities but also
a “discussion of the significant problems faced
by consumers in shopping for or obtaining
consumer financial products and services,”
and an analysis of the complaints that the bureau has received from consumers. Dodd-
Frank charged entities with competing viewpoints—the independent Office of Financial
Research, the FSOC, and the Fed—to monitor
and assess risks to the financial system.
Leverage and Liquidity

Concerning leverage, many ask whether the
new capital levels are set high enough for the
largest, most interconnected, and systemically
important firms. The heightened capital requirements on these firms, known as the SIFI
surcharge, require firms to have much higher
levels of “total loss absorbing capacity” to meet
resolution requirements; however, it is not
clear that equity levels are an adequate response to the firms’ systemic risks. We must
keep close watch on these firms and not be
afraid to adjust the surcharge up as needed.
On liquidity, firms have greatly reduced
their use of short-term debt, but much more
needs to be done to address the risks posed by
short-term funding. As a first step, we need to
implement the Basel Committee’s approach to
asset liquidity. In the United States, the Federal
Reserve has implemented a SIFI surcharge that
also takes into account liquidity risks, and
such an approach should be adopted globally.
Money market funds remain a source of risk
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in the system, even after the SEC’s reforms,
and I believe stable net asset value funds
should hold capital against these risks. FX (foreign exchange) markets need to move toward
greater transparency, while margin and collateral requirements should be improved.
Asset Bubbles

The formation of asset bubbles is a third
source of risk that could lead to a future financial crisis, as it did to the last. Countercyclical
prudential measures, especially countercyclical capital standards, can help risks posed by
asset bubbles. Countercyclical capital standards require financial institutions to hold
more capital during boom times and less capital after downturns. It is also worth thinking
about whether asset-specific countercyclical
rules would help limit the formation of bubbles. For example, Switzerland requires financial institutions to hold more capital against
mortgage-backed assets as home values increase. Israel has adopted countercyclical
mortgage lending regulations, including loan-
to-value requirements. Going forward, we also
need to make critical decisions about the future of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the U.S.
system of housing finance. We should focus on
creating a housing finance system that has
broad access to affordable and sustainable
mortgage credit, protects taxpayers, and provides a realistic mechanism through which the
government could stem a housing crisis.
Misunderstood Innovation

A fourth risk comes from misunderstood financial innovations. Financial innovation
drives economic growth by efficiently allocating capital. It lowers transaction costs, increases liquidity, and helps disperse risk. It
helps ensure that the needs of market participants are fully met. At the same time, however,
financial innovation can hide risk. The financial sector sometimes creates complex financial products for the purpose of exploiting uninformed consumers or investors. Financial
innovations can also create risk when a product that was developed to meet the needs of a
small subset of the market is offered to a
broader, less-sophisticated market. We saw
that happen in the mortgage market when op-
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tion ARMs or “pick a pay” mortgages, designed
to meet uneven cash flow experienced by a
small subset of the affluent self-employed,
were sold to masses of borrowers who could
ill-afford the risks such products posed.
Today, we see problems with exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) and high-frequency trading. ETFs are popular with investors because
they provide a low-cost, tax-efficient means of
investing in a diversified fund. Recently, however, innovation in the ETF market has resulted in increasingly complex and opaque
funds that may pose risks to investors and to
financial stability. This innovation includes the
creation of synthetic, leveraged, and inverse
ETFs, and runs the risks of contagions in ETF
markets, when illiquidity in primary markets
makes orderly investor redemptions in ETFs
more difficult.
High-frequency trading uses computers and
algorithms to make trades in less than a millisecond. Such high-speed trading has the
potential to improve market efficiency and liquidity. But it also raises serious concerns for
financial stability—high-frequency trading
contributed to the “flash crash” on May 6, 2010,
when stock prices inexplicably and suddenly
plunged, and may undermine the fairness of
financial markets. Unfortunately, regulators
have been behind the curve in understanding
the way such trading functions and its potential risks.
Regulating in the face of financial innovations is challenging. It is difficult to achieve the
right balance between addressing the risks
posed by innovation while maintaining its benefits.
I believe the solution lies in developing flexible forms of regulation that foster innovation
while focusing on buffers in the system and
regulatory checks and balances.
Global Risk

Last, we face the risk that global reform and
recovery efforts will go off track. Sovereign risk
remains real, a global mechanism to resolve
ailing financial firms is still a goal rather than
a reality, and the risk from lack of global coordination is great. Yet we still are building a financial architecture that relies on multiple architects and plans.

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

16

fina nci a l refor m

T h i s Vo lu m e ’ s C o n tr i b ut i o n s

Scholars have developed varying approaches to
assess financial reform since the crisis and no
single journal issue could provide a comprehensive overview. This journal issue brings
together a series of articles focused on the
Dodd-Frank Act as a whole, systemic risk and
resolution authority, consumer and investor
protection, market structure, and global reforms. The articles were developed for a conference on the financial crisis hosted by the
University of Michigan’s Center on Finance,
Law, and Policy.
Martin Baily, Aaron Klein, and Justin Schardin have divided Dodd-Frank’s major reforms
into five categories: areas that in their judgment are clear wins, clear losses, costly tradeoffs, reforms that did not go far enough, and
areas where it is too soon to tell. They argue
that increased capital requirements, the new
single-point-of-entry resolution mechanism,
and the creation of the CFPB are clear wins,
and the restrictions on the government’s crisis
management tools in Dodd-Frank are a clear
loss. They see the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln
Amendment on derivatives trading as costly
tradeoffs in the bill, and argue that the bill did
not go far enough in consolidating the financial regulatory system. Empirical evidence will
be required to test whether their initial judgments are correct.
Howell Jackson argues that the single-point-
of-entry framework for the resolution of systemically important financial institutions,
while it will help prevent the spread of losses
through the financial system in a future crisis,
nevertheless raises several concerns. First, the
framework may increase moral hazard by expanding the scope of government support. Second, it may be more difficult than the FDIC
anticipates for a holding company to send
funding down to operating subsidiaries in a
resolution. Third, there may be impediments
to triggering losses of holding company creditors. Jackson suggests specific reforms that can
strengthen the ability to deal with a financial
firm’s failure.
Lauren Willis argues for a new approach to
consumer protection, moving away from mere
disclosure to requiring firms to demonstrate
that consumers comprehend the costs and

benefits of a financial product or service before
it is made available in the market. The Dodd-
Frank Act directed the CFPB to promulgate
rules designed to ensure that consumers understand the “costs, benefits, and risks” associated with the financial products and services
they purchase. Willis argues that although
mandatory disclosures may increase comprehension in lab tests, consumers take shortcuts
and firms run circles around the disclosures in
practice. Willis advocates for the CFPB to
adopt comprehensive performance standards
instead of mandating disclosures. For example, a bank imposing overdraft fees would have
to prove to the CFPB, through third-party testing, that customers know how overdraft fees
work under various situations.
Jonathan Macey advocates for affording
home mortgage borrowers the same protections as investors in the securities market.
Macey argues that adopting basic protections
from securities regulation would create integral protection for consumers in the home
mortgage market. For example: (1) the duty of
best execution, which would require mortgage
brokers to give borrowers the best deal available to them at that time, (2) the suitability
requirement, which would require mortgage
brokers to have reasonable grounds to believe
the mortgage is suitable for the borrower, and
(3) the antichurning requirement, which would
prevent brokers from encouraging borrowers
to refinance to collect fees.
Michael Wellman argues that researchers
must evaluate the effects of trading techniques
in specific contexts to understand the effects
of algorithmic and high-frequency trading on
financial markets. He explains the model he
created that combines an agent-based market
simulation with a game theoretic analysis. The
model shows the effects of high-frequency
trading used for latency arbitrage, which involves traders taking advantage of the time it
takes information to travel from one market to
another. The study found that high-frequency
trading decreased overall market efficiency,
even before accounting for the costs of creating the infrastructure necessary to make these
trades. The model has also been used to show
the effects of high-frequency trading in market
making, where traders create a market for se-
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curities by maintaining offers to both buy and
sell a security. Though high-frequency trading
is usually thought to increase market liquidity,
in many instances market efficiency decreased
when liquidity was most needed.
A major post-crisis task for international finance and its regulators has been to develop
better tools to measure systemic risk in the
financial system. Viral Acharya suggests using
a market measurement, SRISK, which uses a
firm’s size, leverage, and risk profile to measure its vulnerability to a capital shortfall in a
future crisis and the health of the financial
system as a whole. The SRISK model suggests
that the U.S. financial sector has grown
steadily safer since the crisis. The European
financial sector grew in risk, peaking during
the sovereign debt crisis of 2011, and has
grown somewhat safer since then. The Asian
financial sector—Chinese financial institutions in particular—has grown increasingly
risky since the crisis. Acharya explains how the
measure can improve regulator and market understanding of financial risk going forward.
Shedding light on one issue in global finance, Niamh Maloney argues that a fundamental shift has occurred in European financial
regulation, and some fundamental new trends
can be seen hidden in plain sight by the muddling, iterative, and complex regional machinations of Europe. Beneath the fractured and contentious crisis-driven negotiations lie: a strong
push toward centralization; more European-
level regulation of both prudential and consumer financial regulation; cross-border risk
sharing by national governments; and harder
law. The changes will have profound effects not
only on the shape of financial regulation, but
also on the continuously evolving tug between
Euro-centrism and national prerogatives.
C o n c lu s i o n

The financial system is safer, consumers and
investors better protected, and taxpayers better
insulated than they were before the crisis, but
significant risks still remain. It will be critical
to stay on the path of reform. The articles in
this volume of the RSF Journal of the Social Sciences provide new insights into several important aspects of reform. As the volume editor I
do not agree with every aspect of the analyses
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offered, and the same will be true for readers.
But the articles provide engaging and essential
reading for understanding the tradeoffs involved in policymaking, and innovative ideas
for making the financial system more resilient,
market structure more efficient, finance fairer
for consumers and investors, and global financial regulation better coordinated and effective.
There has been progress under the Dodd-
Frank Act and global reforms in tackling many
of these problems, but much more work needs
to be done. Dodd-Frank and global rules have
increased the amount of capital the largest
firms have to hold, with a higher capital surcharge. In the United States there is now a cap
on the relative size of the largest firms, such
that mergers or acquisitions are blocked when
a firm hits the cap. New liquidation procedures
under Dodd-Frank require a firm’s managers,
shareholders, and long-term debt holders to
bear the losses of a firm’s failure, not taxpayers. Living wills, structural reforms, and requirements for total loss-absorbing capacity
are making it more feasible to resolve failing
major financial firms, but questions remain as
to who will hold the long-term debt and how
knock-on effects will be managed.
Building on these reforms, we need further
effective steps to regulate the shadow banking
world and curb the use of “hot money,” including an explicit tax on liabilities that increases
with the intensity of use of short-term wholesale funding, strong collateral and margin
rules for securities financing transactions, and
further money market fund reform to reduce
the risk that we’ll experience another “bank”
run or $3 trillion guarantee in that sector in
the next crisis.
We must curb abusive high-frequency trading practices, bolster protections for exchange-
traded funds, and make our markets more
transparent and fair, by tackling conflicts of
interest that too often leave regular investors
exposed to unnecessary risks and fees.
We ought to require accountability at the
top. Senior managers should suffer decreases
of their compensation when their firms fail to
meet capital standards or are hit with fines or
penalties. The SEC must use its new authorities
to fine credit-rating agencies that bend their
analyses to meet the desires of Wall Street firms.
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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
must be strengthened and supported, not attacked at every turn. One key step is barring
the kind of arbitration clauses in consumer finance contracts that prevent consumers from
banding together to get their day in court (Barr
2015b). Financial innovation needs to focus on
new ways to help families cope with their volatile income and expenses, and make it easier
and less expensive to build a financial cushion.
We also need to stop abusive small business
lending practices and instead expand access to
capital, skills, and business opportunities.
(Barr 2015c).
The financial system is much safer and a
good bit fairer than it was prior to the financial
crisis, but that is not enough. We must keep
fighting for a financial system that works for
all of us.
R e fe r e n c e s
Agarwal, Sumit, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Neale
Mahoney, and Johannes Stroebel. 2015. “Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from
Credit Cards.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
130(1): 111–64.
Barr, Michael S., Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar
Shafir. 2009. “The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation.” In New Perspectives on Regulation, edited by D. Moss and J. Cisternino.
Cambridge, Mass.: Tobin Project, 2009.
Barr, Michael S. 2012a. No Slack: The Financial Lives
of Low-income Americans. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution.
———. 2012b. “The Financial Crisis and the Path of
Reform.” Yale Journal on Regulation 29(1): 91–
119.

Barr, Michael S., and Daniel Schaffa. 2016. “Nothing
Left to Lose?” University of Michigan Working
Paper. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
Barr, Michael S., and John Vickers. 2013. “Banks
Need Far More Structural Reform to Be Safe.” Financial Times, July 21, 2013.
Coates, John C., IV. 2015. “Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications.” Yale Law Journal 124(4): 882–1345.
Coffee, John C., Jr. 2011. “Systemic Risk After Dodd-
Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight.” Columbia
Law Review 111(4): 795–821.
———. 2012. “The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank:
Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated
and Systemic Risk Perpetuated.” Cornell Law Review 97(5): 1019.
Cordray, Richard. 2015. Financial Report of the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year
2015. November 16. Available at: http://files
.consumerfinance.gov/f/201511_cfpb_report_fiscal
-year-2015.pdf; accessed September 16, 2016.
Duffie, Darrell. 2013. “Replumbing Our Financial
System: Uneven Progress.” International Journal
of Central Banking 9(1): 251.
Gersen, Jacob E. 2013. “Administrative Law Goes to
Wall Street: The New Administrative Process.”
Administrative Law Review 65(3): 689–731.
Gorton, Gary, and Andrew Metrick. 2012. “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo.” Journal of
Financial Economics 104(3): 425–51.
Levitin, Adam J. 2011. “In Defense of Bailouts,”
Georgetown Law Journal 99(2): 435–514.
Ludwig, Eugene A., 2012. “Assessment of Dodd-
Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths,
Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger
Regulatory System.” Yale Journal on Regulation
29(1): 181–99.

———. 2014. “Who’s in Charge of Global Finance?”

Massad, Timothy. 2015. Keynote Remarks of Chair-

Georgetown Journal of International Law 45(20):

man Timothy Massad before the Risk USA Con-

971–1027.

ference, New York, October 22, 2015. Available

———. 2015a. “Accountability and Independence in
Financial Regulation: Checks and Balances, Public Engagement, and Other Innovations.” Law and
Contemporary Problems 78(3): 119–28.
———. 2015b. “Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Finance and Investor Contracts.” New York University Journal of Law and Business 11(4): 793–817.
———. 2015c. “Minority and Women Entrepreneurs:

at: http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Speeches
Testimony/opamassad-31; accessed July 13,
2016.
Roe, Mark. 1996. “Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics,” Harvard Law Review 109: 641–68.
Scott, Hal S. 2010. “An Economy in Crisis: Law, Policy, and Morality During the Recession. Article I.
Suggestions for Regulatory Reform: The Reduc-

Building Capital, Networks and Skills. Hamilton

tion of Systemic Risk in the United States Finan-

Project Discussion Paper 2015-03. Washington,

cial System.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public

D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Policy 33(2): 671.

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

